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WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY
clearly that their reasons were frequently and substantially different. These differences serve to illuminate the context of the Constitution and to illustrate the evolutionary character of American political thought.
II
At the center of the theoretical expression of Anti-Federalist opposition to increased centralization of power in the national government was the belief that republican government was possible only for a relatively small territory and a relatively small and homogeneous population. James Winthrop of Massachusetts expressed a common belief when he said, "The idea of an uncompounded republick, on an average one thousand miles in length, and eight hundred in breadth, and containing six millions of white inhabitants all reduced to the same standard of morals, of habits, and of laws, is in itself an absurdity, and contrary to the whole experience of mankind."' The last part of this statement, at least, was true; history was on the side of the Anti-Fcderalists. So was the authority of contemporary political thought. Thc name of Montesquicu carried great weight, and he had taught that republican governments were appropriate for small territories only. He was cited frequently, but his opinion would probably not have been accepted had it not reflected their own experience and inclinations. As colonials they had enjoyed self-government in colony-size packages only and had not sought to extend its operation cmpirc-wisc. It is significant that the various proposals for colonial representation in Parliaevery evidence of bias in favor of the "aristocrats" who framed it. Note, for example, the attitude of Amos Singletary expressed in the Massachusetts ratifying convention: "These lawyers, and men of learning and moneyed men, that talk so finely, and gloss over matters so smoothly, to make us poor illiterate people swallow down the pill, expect to get into Congress themselves; they expect to be managers of this Constitution, and get all the power and all the money into their own hands, and then they will swallow up all us little folks like the great Leviathan; yes, just as the 7 ment never grew deep roots during the debate preceding the Revolution. This association of self-government with relatively small geographical units reinforced Montesquicu's doctrine and led to further generalizations. A large republic was impossible, it was argued, because the center of government must necessarily be distant from the people. Their interest would then naturally decrease; and when this happened, "it would not suit the genius of the people to assist in the government," and "Nothing would support the government, in such a case as that, but military coercion." Patrick Henry argued that republican government for a continent was impossible because it was "a work too great for human wisdom."7 Associated with the argument regarding sizc was the assumption that any people who were to govern themselves must be relatively homogeneous in interest, opinion, habits, and mores. The theme was not systematically explored, but it apparently stemmed from the political relativism prevalent at the time,8 and from the recent experience of conflicts of interest between the colonies and Great Britain, and later between various states and sections of the new confederation.
It is not easy to measure the relative strength of national and state sentiment in either individuals or groups,9 but it is clear that the AntiFederalists were conscious of, and emphasized, the cultural diversity of the peoples in the thirteen states. They argued that no one set of laws could operate over such diversity. Said a Southerner, "We see plainly that men who come from New England are different from us."10 He did not Elliot, IV, p. 52. T " Political relativism had long been a part of the colonial heritage. Seventeenthcentury Puritans, who were sure that God had regulated many aspects of life with remarkable precision, believed that He had left each people considerable freedom in the choice of their form of government. The secularized legacy of this belief prevailcd throughout the era of framing state and national constitutions. Fundamental principles derived from natural law were of course universally valid, and certain "political maxims" regarding the structure of the government very nearly so, but the embodiment of these general truths in concrete political forms was necessarily determined by the nature and circumstances of the people involved.
'On this subject see John C. Ranney, "Thc Bases of American Federalism," William and Mary Quarterly, Series 3, Vol. III, No. I (January, I946).
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wish to be governed either with or by such men. Neither did the New Englanders wish to share a political roof with Southerners. "The inhabitants of warmer climates are more dissolute in their manners, and less industrious, than in colder countries. A degree of severity is, therefore, necessary with one which would cramp the spirit of the other.... It is impossible for one code of laws to suit Georgia and Massachusetts."11 To place both types of men under the same government would be abhorrent and quite incompatible with the retention of liberty. Either the new government would collapse, or it would endeavor to stamp out diversity and level all citizens to a new uniformity in order to survive. Such was the reasoning of the leading New England publicist, James Winthrop. His indebtedness to Montesquieu is obvious. His failure to grasp the principles of the new federalism is also clear; for the purposes of this argument, and indeed for almost all of their arguments, he and his colleagues refused to consider the proposed government as one of limited, enumerated powers. They constantly spoke and wrote as if the scope and extent of its powers would be the same as those of the respective state governments, or of a unified national government.12
In addition to the absence of cultural homogeneity, the Anti-Federalists emphasized the clash of specific economic and political interests. These were primarily sectional,18 and were of more acute concern in the South than in the North. In Virginia, for example, George Mason expressed the fear that the power of Congress to regulate commerce might be the South's downfall. In Philadelphia he had argued that this power be exercised by a two-thirds majority, and he now feared that by requiring only a simple majority "to make all commercial and navigation laws, the five southern states (whose produce and circumstances are totally different from those of the eight northern and eastern states) will be ruined .... ."14 It was also argued in several of the Southern conventions that a majority of the Eastern states might conspire to close the Mississippi,15 and that they might From the Agrippa Letters, Ford, Essays, p. 64. 121t was this misunderstanding of the proposed new system which Madison attempted to remove in Federalist 39.
18 Curiously enough, the Big-Little State fight, which almost broke up the Convention, played very little part in the ratification debates. And ironically one of the evidences of ideological unity which made the "more perfect union" possible was the similarity of arguments put forth by the Anti-Federalists in their respective states.
14 "Objections," Ford, Pamphlets, p. eventually interfere with the institution of slavery.16 In New England and the Middle states, there was less feeling that the interests of the entire section were in jeopardy, and therefore less discussion of these concrete issues and their divisive effect. One writer did strike out at the Federalist plea for a transcendent nationalism and repudiated the notion of sacrificing local interests to a presumed general interest as unrealistic and prejudicial to freedom. "It is vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests. It is only by protecting local concerns that the interest of the whole is preserved." He went on to say that men entered into society for egoistic rather than altruistic motives, that having-once done so, all were bound to contribute equally to the common welfare, and that to call for sacrifices of local interest was to violate this principle of equality and to subvert "the foundation of free government."17 There was much to be said for Winthrop's argument. It was an unequivocal statement of the principle that self-interest is the primary bond of political union. It was also an expression of an attitude which has always playCd a large part in our national politics: a refusal to sacrifice-sometimies even to subordinate-the welfare of a part to that of the whole. Pursuit of an abstract national interest has sometimes proved dangerous, and there was a healthy toughness in the Anti-Federalist insistence on the importance of local interests. But Winthrop skirted around the really difficult questions raised by his argument, which were also inherent in the Anti-Fcderalist position that the size of the United States and the diversity which existed among them were too great to be consistent with one republican government operating over the whole. No one would deny that a certain amount of unity or consensus is required for the foundation of popular, constitutional government; not very many people-now or in 1787-would go as far as Rousseau and insist on virtually absolute identity of interest and opinion. The Anti-Federalists were surprisingly close to Rousseau and to the notions of republicanism which influenced him, but they were sensible, practical men and did not attempt to define their position precisely. Consequently they left untouched two difficult questions: how much, and what kind of unity is required for the foundation of any republican government, large or small; and how, in the absence of perfect uniformity, arc differences of opinion and interest to be resolved? e Elliot, IV, pp. 272-273. 11 Agrippa Lctters, Ford, Essays, p. 73. III -The Anti-Federalist theory of representation was closely allied to the belief that republican government could operate only over a small area. The proposed Constitution provided that the first House of Representatives should consist of sixty-five members, and that afterwards the ratio of representation should not exceed one representative for thirty thousand people. This provision was vigorously criticized and was the chief component of the charge that the Constitution was not sufficiently democratic. The argument was two-fold: first, that sixty-five men could not possibly represent the multiplicity of interests spread throughout so great a country; second, that those most likely to be left out would be of the more democratic or "middling" elements in society. The minority who voted against ratification in the Pennsylvania Convention calculated that the combined quorums of the House and Senate was only twenty-five, and concluded that this number plus the President could not possibly represent "the sense and views of three or four millions of people, diffused over so extensive a territory, comprising such various climates, products, habits, interests, and opinions.... 18 This argument, accompanied with the same calculus, was repeated many times during the ratification debate.
Almost all of the leaders of the opposition laid down what they believed to be the requisites of adequate representation, and there is a remarkable similarity in their definitions. George Mason, speaking in the Virginia Convention against giving the central government the power of taxation, based his argument on the inadequacy of representation as measured by his criteria: "To make representation real and actual, the number of representatives ought to be adequate; they ought to mix with the people, think as they think, feel as they feel,-ought to be perfectly amenable to them, and thoroughly acquainted with their interest and condition."19 In his Letters of a Federal Farmer, Richard Henry Lee developed the same idea further:
. a full and equal representation is that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the people themselves would were they all assembled-a fair representation, therefore, should be so regulated, that every It was the contention of the Anti-Federalists that because of the small size of the House of Representatives, the middle and lower orders in society would not be elected to that body, and that consequently this, the only popular organ of the government, would not be democratic at all. It would, instead, be filled by aristocrats, possibly by military heroes and demagogues.21 Why should this be? Lee asserted simply that it would be "in the nature of things." Mason seems to have assumed it without any comment or argument. Patrick Henry reasoned that since the candidates would be chosen from large electoral districts rather than from counties, they would not all be known by the electors, and "A common man must ask a man of influence how he is to proceed, and for whom he must vote. The elected, therefore, will be careless of the interest of the electors. It will be a common job to extort the suffrages of the common people for the most influential characters.22 This argument reflects one of the basic fears of the Anti-Federalists: loss of personal, direct contact with and knowledge of their representatives. They sensed quite accurately that an enlargement of the area of republican government would lead to a more impersonal system, and that the immediate, individual influence of each voter over his representative would be lessened.
The most elaborate explanation of the anticipated results of the electoral process was given by the moderate Anti-Federalist in New York, Melancton Smith. He argued that very few men of the "middling" class would choose to run for Congress, because the office would be "highly elevated and distinguished," the style of living probably "high." Such circumstances would "render the place of a representative not a desirable one to sensible, substantial men, who have been used to walking in the plain and frugal paths of life." Even if such should choose to run for election, they 12 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY would almost certainly be defeated. In a large electoral district it would be% difficult for any but a person of "conspicuous military, popular, civil, or legal talents" to win. The common people were more likely to be divided among themselves than the great, and "There will be scarcely a chance of their uniting in any other but some great man, unless in some popular demagogue, who will probably be destitute of principle. A substantial yeoman, of sense and discernment, will hardly ever be chosen."23 Consequently, the government would be controlled by the great, would not truly reflect the interests of all groups in the community, and would almost certainly become oppressive.
Anti-Federalists in Massachusetts were also uneasy about the capacity of the people to elect a legislature which would reflect their opinions and interests. The arguments emphasized geographical as well as class divisions, and expressed the fear and suspicion felt by the western part of the state toward Boston and the other coastal towns. It was predicted that the latter would enjoy a great advantage under the new system, and this prediction was supported by a shrewd analysis in the Cornelius Letter:
The citizens in the seaport towns are numerous; they live compact; their interests are one; there is a constant connection and intercourse between them; they can, on any occasion, centre their votes where they please. This is not the case with those who are in the landed interest; they are scattered far and wide; they have but little intercourse and connection with each other. To concert uniform plans for carrying elections of this kind is entirely out of their way. Hence, their votes if given at all, will be no less scattered than are the local situations of the voters themselves. Wherever the seaport towns agree to centre their votes, there will, of course, be the greatest number. A gentleman in the country therefore, who may aspire after a seat in Congress, or who may wish for a post of profit under the federal government, must form his connections, and unite his interest with those towns. Thus, I conceive, a foundation is laid for throwing the whole power of the federal government into the hands of those who are in the mercantile interest; and for the landed, which is the great interest of this country to lie unrepresented, forlorn and without 
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What the Anti-Federalists feared, in other words, was the superior opportunities for organized voting which they felt to be inherent in the more thickly populated areas. They shared with the authors of The Federalist the fear of party and faction in the eighteenth-century American sense of those words. But they also feared, as the preceding analyses show, the essence of party in its modern meaning, i.e., organizing the vote, and they wanted constituencies sufficiently small to render such organization unnecessary.
This belief that larger electoral districts would inevitably be to the advantage of the well-to-do partially explains the almost complete lack of criticism of the indirect election of the Senate and the President. If the "middling" class could not be expected to compete successfully with the upper class in Congressional elections, still less could they do so in statewide or nation-wide elections. It was a matter where size was of the essence. True representation-undistorted by party organization-could be achieved only where electoral districts were small.
IV
Tlhe conception of the representative body as a true and faithful miniatturc of the people themselves was the projection of an ideal-almost a poctic one. Very few of its proponents thought it could actually be realizcd. In the Anti-Federalist attack on the Constitution, it served as a foil for an extraordinary picture of anticipated treachery on the part of the representatives to be elected under the proposed government. No distinction was made on the basis of their method of election, whether directly or indirectly by the people. All were regarded as potential tyrants.
This attack stemmed directly from the Anti-Federalist conception of human nature. They shared with their opponents many of the assumptions regarding the nature of man characteristic of American thought in the late eighteenth century. They took for granted that the dominant motive of human behavior was self-interest, and that this drive found its most extreme political expression in an insatiable lust for power. These were precisely the characteristics with which the authors of The Federalist Papers were preoccupied.2" Yet the Anti-Federalists chided the Federalists for their excessive confidence in the future virtue of elected officials, and criticized the Constitution for its failure to provide adequate protection against the operation of these tyrannical drives. There is surely an amusing irony to find the Founding Fathers, who prided themselves on their realism, and who enjoy an enviable reputation for that quality today, taken to task for excessive optimism. But they had to meet this charge again and again. Thus Caldwell in the North Carolina Convention found it "remarkable,-that gentlemen, as an answer to every improper part of it [the Constitution], tell us that every thing is to be done by our own representatives, who are to be good men. There is no security that they will be so, or continue to be so."26 In New York Robert Lansing expressed the same feeling in a passage strikingly reminiscent of the famous paragraph in Madison's Federalist 51:
Scruples would be impertinent, arguments would be in vain, checks would be useless, if we were certain our rulers would be good men; but for the virtuous government is not instituted: its object is to restrain and punish vice; and all free constitutions arc formed with two views-to deter the governed from crime, and the governors from tyranny.27
This and many other similar statements might have been used interchangeably by either side in the debate, for they symbolized an attitude deeply embedded and widely dispersed in the political consciousness of the age. There were frequent references to "the natural lust of power so inherent in man";28 to "the predominant thirst of dominion which has invariably and uniformly prompted rulers to abuse their power";29 to "the ambition of man, and his lust for domination";30 to rulers who would be "men of like passions," having "the same spontaneous inherent thirst for 26 Elliot, IV, p. 187; cf. pp. 203-204, and III, p. 494. Caldwell's statement is very similar to Madison's comment in Federalist xO: "It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm." 27 Elliot, 1I, pp. 295-296. Madison's declaration was this: "But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. It is to be noted that this dreadful lust for power was regarded as a universal characteristic of the nature of man, which could be controlled but not eradicated. Ile Anti-Federalists charged that the authors of the Constitution had failed to put up strong enough barriers to block this inevitably corrupting and tyrannical force. They painted a very black picture indeed of what the national representatives might and probably would do with the unchecked power conferred upon them under the provisions of the new Constitution. The "parade of imaginary horribles" has become an honorable and dependable technique of political debate, but the marvelous inventiveness of the Anti-Federalists has rarely been matched. Certainly the best achievements of their contemporary opponents were conspicuously inferior in dramatic quality, as well as incredibly unimaginative in dull adherence to at least a semblance of reality. The anticipated abuses of power, some real, some undoubtedly conjured as ammunition for debate, composed a substantial part of the case against the Constitution, and they must be examined in order to get at the temper and quality of AntiFederalist thought as well as at its content. Their source was ordinarily a listorted interpretation of some particular clause.
One clause which was believed to lay down a constitutional road to legislative tyranny was Article I, Section 4: "TIe times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators." Here was the death clause of republican government. "This clause may destroy representation entirely," said Timothy Bloodworth of North Carolina.83 If Congress had power to alter the times of elections, Congress might extend its tenure of office from two years to four, six, eight, ten, twenty, "or even for their natural lives."84 Bloodworth and his colleagues feared the worst. In Massachusetts, where debate over this clause occupied a day and a half, the primary fear was that Congress, by altering the places of election, might rig them so as to interfere with a full and Any of these acts would have been a flagrant abuse of power, but no more so than that which Mason and others predicted under Article II, Section 2, which gave to the President the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the senators present. This power was believed to be fraught with danger, particularly among Southerners, who feared that the majority of Northern states might use it to give up American rights of navigation on the Mississippi. The North would not have a two-thirds majority of the entire Senate, of course, but Mason suggested that when a "partial" treaty was involved, the President would not call into session senators from distant states, or those whose interests would be affected adversely, but only those he knew to be in favor of it.!9 His colleague, William Grayson, suggested the similarly treacherous prospect of such a treaty's being rushed through while members from the Southern states were momentarily absent from the floor of This was not the only provision objected to by "the religious part of the society." They were greatly displeased with the last clause of Article VI, Section 3: "but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." In the same speech quoted above, Abbott reported, presumably on behalf of his constituents, "The exclusion of religious tests is by many thought dangerous and impolitic." For without such, "They suppose . . . pagans, deists, and Mahometans might obtain offices among us, and that the senators and representatives might all be pagans."42 David Caldwell thought that the lack of a religious qualification constituted "an invitation for Jews and pagans of every kind to come among us," and that since the Christian religion was acknowledged to be the best for making "good members of society . . . those gentlemen who formed this Constitution should not have given this invitation to Jews and heathens."43 Federalist James Iredell reported a pamphlet in circulation "in which the author states, as a very serious danger, that the pope of Rome might be elected President."44 This unwittingly placed fresh ammunition at the disposal of the opposition. An AntiFederalist admitted that he had not at first perceived this danger and conceded that it was not an immediate one. "But," said he, "let us remember that we form a government for millions not yet in existence. I have not the art of divination. In the course of four or five hundred years, I do not know how it will work. This is most certain, that Papists may occupy that chair, and Mahometans may take it. I see nothing against it. There is a disqualification, I believe, in every state in the Union-it ought to be so in this system."45 I 8 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY It is to be noted that these fears were fears of the majority of electors as well as of their elected representatives, and that these statements can hardly be said to glow with the spirit of liberty and tolerance. These beliefs were undoubtedly not shared by all Anti-Federalists, but they would not have been expressed so vigorously in the convention debates had they not represented a sizeable segment of constituent opinion.
Another provision severely and dramatically criticized was that which gave to Congress exclusive jurisdiction over the future site of the national capital and other property to be purchased for forts, arsenals, dockyards, and the like.46 It was predicted that the ten-mile square area would become an enormous den of tyranny and iniquity. In New York George Clinton warned "that the ten miles square . . . would be the asylum of the base, idle, avaricious and ambitious. .. ." 7 In Virginia Patrick Henry pointed out that this provision, combined with the necessary and proper clause, gave Congress a right to pass "any law that may facilitate the execution of their acts," and within the specified area to hang "any man who shall act contrary to their commands . . . without benefit of clergy."48 George Mason argued that the place would make a perfect lair for hit-and-run tyrants. For if any of the government's "officers, or creatures, should attempt to oppress the people, or should actually perpetuate the blackest deed, he has nothing to do but get into the ten miles square. Why was this dangerous power given?""9 One man observed that the Constitution did not specify the location of this site, and that therefore Congress was perfectly free to seat itself and the other offices of government in Peking. All in all, a terrible prospect: the Pope as President, operating from a base in Peking, superintending a series of hangings without benefit of clergy! Or worse.
There was no bill of rights in the Constitution. This caused genuine fear for the security of some of the liberties thus left unprotected. The back country, in which opposition to the Constitution was strong: "The Hon. Mr. Singletary thought we were giving up all our privileges, as there was no provision that men in power should have any religion, and though he hoped to see Christians, yet by the Constitution, a Papist, or an Infldel, was as eligible as they. It had been said that men had not degenerated; he did not think that men were better now than when men after God's own heart did wickedly. He thought, in this instance, we were giving great power to we know not whom. fear itself, though real and well founded, frequently found expression in melodramatically picturesque terms. The Anti-Federalists sometimes mentioned freedom of the press and freedom of conscience,50 but they were primarily preoccupied with the failure of the Constitution to lay down the precious and venerable common-law rules of criminal procedure. The Constitution guaranteed the right of trial by jury in all criminal cases5t except impeachment, but it did not list the procedural safeguards associated with that right. There was no specification that the trial should be not merely in the state but in the vicinity where the crime was committed (which was habitually identified with the neighborhood of the accused); there were no provisions made for the selection of the jury or of the procedure to be followed; there were no guarantees of the right to counsel, of the right not to incriminate oneself; there was no prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. In short, there were few safeguards upon which the citizen accused of crime could rely. citizen who ran afoul of federal law. Such an individual might be taken away and tried by strangers far from home; his jury might be handpicked by the sheriff, or hold office for life; there was no guarantee that indictment should be by grand jury only, hence it might be by information of the attorney-general, "in consequence of which the most innocent person in the commonwealth may be . . . dragged from his home, his friends, his acquaintance, and confined in prison... i" "On the whole," said Holmes, ".
we shall find Congress possessed of powers enabling them to institute judicatories little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain, which has long been the disgrace of Christendom: I mean that diabolical institution, the Inquisition.
They are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline."" Should Congress have attempted any of these actions, it would have amounted to a virtual coup d'etat and a repudiation of republicanism."5 The advocates of the Constitution argued that such abuse of power could not reasonably be expected on the part of representatives elected by the people themselves. This argument was not satisfactory to the Anti-Federalists. They reiterated again and again the universal perfidy of man, especially men entrusted with political power, and emphasized the necessity of providing adequate protection against manifestations of human depravity. They charged that the authors and advocates of the Constitution were about to risk their liberties and those of all of the people on the slim possibility that the men to be elected to office in the new government would be, and would always be, good men.56
The Federalists also argued that election would serve as a check, since In North Carolina the same opinion was expressed in a rather remarkable interchange. Taylor objected to the method of impeachment on the ground that since the House of Representatives drew up the bill of inlictmnict, and the Senate acted upon it, the members of Congress themselves wvould be virtually immune to this procedure. Governor Johnston answcred that impeachment was not *an appropriate remedy for legislativc misrule, and that "A representative is answerable to no power but his constituents. He is accountable to no being under heaven but the pcoplle who appointed him." To this, Taylor responded simply, "that it now appeared to him in a still worse light than before."58 Johnston stated one of the great principles of representative government; it merely deepened Taylor's fear of Congress. He and his fellow Anti-Federalists strongly wished for what Madison had referred to as "auxiliary precautions" against possible acts of legislative tyranny. V These additional safeguards were of two kinds: more explicit limitations written into the Constitution, and more institutional checks to enforce these limitations.
In recent years the Constitution has been much admired for its brevity, its generality, its freedom from the minutiae which characterized ninetcenth-century constitutions. These qualities were feared and not admired by the Anti-Federalists. They wanted detailed explicitness which would Et Elliot, III, p. i67; cf. p. 327. I Elliot, IV, pp. 32-34. confine the discretion of Congressional majorities within narrow boundaries. One critic complained of "a certain darkness, duplicity and studied ambiguity of expression running through the whole Constitution...." Another said that "he did not believe there existed a social compact on the face of the earth so vague and so indefinite as the one now on the table."60 A North Carolinian demanded to know, "Why not use expressions that were clear and unequivocal?"1 Later, he warned, "Without the most express restrictions, Congress may trample on your rights."62 Williams of New York expressed the general feeling when he said in that state's convention, "I am, sir, for certainty in the establishment of a constitution which is not only to operate upon us, but upon millions yet unborn."6" These men wanted everything down in black and white, with no latitude of discretion or interpretation left to their representatives in Congress. It was an attitude which anticipated the later trend toward lengthy constitutions filled with innumerable and minute restrictions on the legislatures.
To no avail did the Federalists argue that if future representatives should indeed prove to be so treacherous and tyrannical as to commit the horrible deeds suggested, then mere guarantees on paper would not stop them for a minute. It is easy to call the Anti-Federalist attitude unrealistic, but to do so is to miss a large part of its significance. Like the Founding Fathers, like all men of their age, they were great constitutionalists. They were also first-generation republicans, still self-consciously so, and aware that their precious form of government was as yet an experiment and had not proved its capacity for endurance. Its greatest enemy was man's lust for power, and the only thing which could hold this in check, they were convinced, was a carefully written and properly constructed constitution. They placed even greater emphasis on the structure of government than did the Founding Fathers, and refused to take for granted, as the latter did, that the "genius" of the country was republican, and that the behavior of the men to be placed in office would in general be republican also. 
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The Anti-Federalists wanted a more rigid system of separation of powers, more numerous and more effective checks and balances, than the Founding Fathers had provided.64 They thought this elementary principle of good government, this "political maxim," had been violated, and that corruption leading to tyranny would be the inevitable result. That the doctrine celebrated by Montesquieu did enjoy the status of "maxim" seems unquestionable. Violation of separation of powers was one of George Mason's major objections to the Constitution.6" Richard Henry Lee made the same protest,66 and further lamented that there were no "checks in the formation of the government, to secure the rights of the people against the usurpations of those they appoint to govern... ." 67 James Monroe said that he could "see no real checks in it."68 It is no wonder that an obscure member of the Virginia Convention, when he rose with great diffidence to make his only speech, chose safe and familiar ground to cover:
That the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be separate and distinct, in all free governments, is a political fact so well established, that I presume I shall not be thought arrogant, when I affirm that no country ever did, or ever can, long remain free, where they are blended. All the states have been in this sentiment when they formed their state constitutions, and therefore have guarded against the danger; and every schoolboy in politics must be convinced of the propriety of the observation; and yet, by the proposed plan, the legislative and executive powers are closely united....69
In Pennsylvania, whose Revolutionary state constitution had embodied very little of separation of powers, an apparent return to Montesquieu's doctrine led to criticism of the Constitution. In the ratifying convention, one of the amendments submitted had for its purpose "That the legislative, executive, and judicial powers be kept separate. 4Ibid., pp. 42I, 563. Grayson also expressed his preference for a form of government-if there was to be a national government at all-far less popular than the one proposed. He favored one strikingly similar to the plan Hamilton had suggested in Philadelphia, a president and senate elected for life, and a lower house elected for a three-year term. See Elliot, III, p. 279.
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In New York, Melancton Smith returned to the subject several times, arguing, because there would eventually be corruption in Congress, "It is wise to multiply checks to a greater degree than the present state of things requires."" In Massachusetts James Winthrop tied up the concept of separation of powers with checks and balances very neatly. "It is noew generally understood that it is for the security of the people that the powers of the government should be lodged in different branches. By this means publick business will go on when they all agree, and stop when they disagree. The advantage of checks in government is thus manifested where the concurrence of different branches is necessary to the same act... "7"
Thlere can be little doubt that the Anti-Federalists were united in their desire to put more checks on the new government. This was natural, since they greatly feared it. Expressions of the opposite opinion were extremely rare. Rawlins Lowndes in South Carolina remarked casually and withotut elaboration that it was possible to have too many checks on a government." George Clinton and the Pennsylvanian "Centinel" both wvarned that a government might become so complex that the people cOUldl not undcrstand it,78 but both men expressed the usual fear of abuse of powcr,79 and "Centinel" paid his respects to Montesquieu and explicitly criticized the inadequacy of checks by the President or the House of Representatives on the Senate.80 h'lhus no one, so far as I have been able to discover, attacked the gencral validity of the system of separation of powers and checks and balances. The Anti-Fcderalists were staunch disciples of Montesquieu on this subject, and they would have found quite unacceptable J. Allen Smith's dictum that "The system of checks and balances must not be confused with democracy; it is opposed to and cannot be reconciled with the theory of popular government. tion from Montesquieu's doctrine, there were surprisingly few proposals for specific alterations in the structure of the new government. Of these, the most important was a change in the relationship between President and Senate. The latter's share in the treaty-making and appointing powers was believed to be a dangerous blending of executive and legislative power which ought to have been avoided. Possibly because of their recent memory of the role of the colonial governor's council, possibly because there was no clear provision in the Constitution for an executive cabinet or council, the Anti-Federalists saw the Senate very much in the latter's role and expected it to play a very active and continuous part in giving advice to the President. This was clearly contrary to the doctrine of the celebrated Montesquieu-at least it seemed so to them. The result would certainly be some form of joint Presidential-Senatorial tyranny, it was argued, but as to which of the two departments would be the stronger of the "partners in crime," the Anti-Federalists were not agreed. Patrick Henry said that the President, with respect to the treatymaking power, "as distinguished from the Senate, is nothing."82 Grayson, with the North-South division in mind, predicted a quid pro quo alliance between the President and "the seven Eastern states." "He will accom--modate himself to their interests in forming treaties, and they will continue him perpetually in office."88 Mason predicted a "marriage' between the President and Senate: "They will be continually supporting and aiding each other: they will always consider their interest as united.... The executive and legislative powers, thus connected, will destroy all balances... .84 "Centinel" of Pennsylvania also feared that the President would not be strong enough to resist pressure from the Senate, and that he would join with them as "the head of the aristocratic junto."85 Spencer of North Carolina, in support of a remedy in which all of the above men concurred, argued that with an advisory council entirely separate from the legislature, and chosen from the separate states, the President "would have that independence which is necessary to form the intended check upon the acts passed by the legislature before they obtain the sanction of 
WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY
The most insistent and repeated criticism was the failure of the Constitution to provide for the compulsory rotation of office for Senators and the President. "Nothing is so essential to the preservation of a republican government as a periodical rotation," said George Mason,9' and Melancton Smith pronounced it "a very important and truly republican institution."92 They greatly feared that President and Senators would be perpetually re-elected, and in effect hold office for life. Mason, for example, was quite content for the Senate to serve six years, and the President even eight, but he believed that without rotation, the new government would become "an elective monarchy."93 The President would be able to perpetuate himself forever, it was assumed, because his election would always be thrown into the House of Representatives. In that body, corruption, intrigue, foreign influence, and above all else, the incumbent's use of his patronage, would make it possible for every man, once elected, to hold office for life. Senators would* "hold their office perpetually,"94 by corrupting their electors, the state legislatures. In New York, where the subject was debated very thoroughly, the Anti-Federalists were challenged to show how such corruption could take place, and continue for life, among a group which was continuously subject to popular election, and which would presumably not be permanent. To this challenge Lansing replied, "It-is unnecessary to particularize the numerous ways in which public bodies are accessible to corruption. The poison always finds a channel, and never wants an object."95 No distinction as to comparativetcdrruptibility was made between national and state representatives.
To Federalist objections that compulsory rotation constituted an abridgment of the people's right to elect whomsoever they wished, Melancton Smith replied impatiently, "What is government itself but a restraint upon the natural rights of the people? What constitution was ever devised that did not operate as a restraint on their natural liberties?"90 Lansing conceded that rotation placed a restriction on the people's free choice-of rulers, but he thought this beneficial: "Tle rights of the people will be best supported by checking, at a certain point, the current of popular favor, and preventing the establishment of an influence which may leave to elections little more than the form of freedom. 
MEN OF LITTLE FAITH
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The power of recall by state legislatures was associated with compulsory rotation as a means of preventing senatorial abuse of power. Not only would it enforce strict responsibility of senators to their electors, but in so doing it would protect the interests and preserve the sovereignty of the separate states. For these reasons, its adoption was strongly pressed in several of the ratifying conventions. Beyond these reasons, which were primary, recall combined with rotation would have a secondary beneficent result. It would serve to prevent the perpetuation of intra-legislative parties and factions-something which the Anti-Federalists feared quite as much as their opponents. Even if the power of recall should not actually be used, said Lansing, it would "destroy party spirit." 8 When his opponents turned this argument against him, and suggested that factions within the state legislatures might use the power to remove good, honorable, and faithful men from the Senate, the answer was that the legislatures had not abused the power under the Articles of Confederation and would almost certainly not do so in the future, and that even if they did, ample opportunity would be provided for the displaced senator to defend himsclf. 1Thc influence of "ambitious and designing men" would be detected ;'lrl cxpose(l, and thc crror easily corrected.99 A curious "Trust them, trust theni not" attitude toward the state legislatures is thus revealed. They Could not bc trusted to refuse re-election to unfaithful or ambitious senators, though they could be trusted to remove the same and to leave in oflice all those who deserved well of them and of their constituents. l'rom this it is clear that the Anti-Federalists were not willing to trust cither upper or lower house of the proposed national Congress; neither were they willing to trust their own state legislatures completely, though they had less fear of the latter because these could be kept under closer obscrvat ionf.
Tlhc same attitude is indicated by Anti-Federalist reaction to the restrictions place(d on state legislatures by Article I, Section Io of the Constitution, and to the then potential review of both state and national legislation l)y thle Supreme Court.
Of the latter prospect, frequently said to have been one of the great bulwarks erected against the democratic majority, very little was said dTuring the ratification debate. There was no explicit provision for judicial review in the Constitution, and it is probably not possible to prove I" L.iliot, 11, P. 290. I' bAid., p. 299. conclusively whether or not its authors intended the Supreme Court to exercise this power. The evidence suggests that they probably assumed it would. Hamilton's Federalist 78 supports this view. The issue was never debated in the state conventions, and there are almost no references to it in any of the Anti-Federalist arguments. Since Federalist 78 was published before the Virginia, New York, and North Carolina Conventions met, this lack of discussion is significant and would seem to reflect lack of concern. There was severe criticism of Article III, particularly in Virginia, but it centered around the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to be established by Congress, not around the Supreme Court. The issue was entirely one of state courts versus federal courts, not of courts versus legislatures.
The single direct reference to judicial review made in the Virginia Convention-at least the only one I have found-suggests that this institution was, or would have been, thoroughly congenial to the Anti-Federalists. The statement was made by Patrick Henry:
Yes, sir, our judges opposed the acts of the legislature. We have this landmark to guide us. They had fortitude to declare that they were the judiciary, and would oppose unconstitutional acts. Are you sure that your federal judiciary will act thus? Is that judiciary as well constructed, and as independent of the other branches, as our state judiciary? Where are your landmarks in this government? I will be bold to say you cannot find any in it. I take it as the highest encomium on this country, that the acts of the legislature, if unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by the judiciary.100
There was nothing equivocal about Henry's attitude. It elicited no comment. Possibly neither side wished to commit itself; more likely the statement was lost and forgotten after brighter flames had issued from the great orator's fire. What is really significant, however, is the complete absence of debate over judicial review. The Anti-Federalists probed the Constitution for every conceivable threat, explicit or implicit, to their conception of free and popular government. If they had considered judicial review such a threat, they would surely have made the most of it, and particularly after Federalist 78 was published.
There was also comparatively little attention given to the restrictions which Article I, Section Io of the Constitution placed on the state legis-31 latures. Among other things, the states were forbidden to coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold or silver legal tender for the payment of debts, or pass any law impairing the obligations of contracts. These are the provisions which recent historians have emphasized as designed to protect the property of the conservative class against the onslaughts of the radical democratic majority. The Anti-Federalists had very little to say about these provisions. The notation of the New York Convention's action is significant: "The committee then proceded through sections 8, 9, and Io, of this article [I] , and the whole of the next, with little or no debate."'01 In Virginia and the Carolinas there was more discussion, but nothing like a full-dress debate, and very little indication of any strong or widespread opposition. In fact, Patrick Henry said that the restrictions were "founded in good principles,"' 02 and William Grayson said of the prohibition against paper money, "it is unanimously wished by every one that it should not be objected to."'03 Richard Henry Lee expressed his preference for paper money to be issued by Congress only.'04 Of the few objections or doubts expressed, these were typical. Henry in Virginia and Galloway in North Carolina both expressed a fear that the contract clause might be interpreted to force the states to redeem their respective shares of the depreciated Continental currency and of state securities at face value.'05 Henry was also angry because of the necessary implication that the states were too "depraved" to be trusted with the contracts of their own citizens.'08 With regard to the prohibition of paper money, two men in North Carolina defended the previous state issue as having been a necessary expedient in troublesome times, but did not seem to object to the prohibition of future issues.107 One man argued against this clause and the supreme law clause on the ground that the effect might be to destroy the paper money already in circulation and thereby create great confusion.'08 His contention was denied.'09 These remarks, none of which expressed direct opposition, were typical. In South Carolina, 32 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY however, Rawlins Lowndes came out flatly against this restriction, defended the previous issue of paper money and the right of the state to make further issues in the future.110 His position appears to have been the exception, at least of those which were expressed openly and publicly on the various convention floors.111
The response of the Anti-Federalists to these important limitations on the power of .the states can accurately be described, I think, as one of overall approbation tempered by some doubts caused by fear that they would be applied retroactively. This attitude is in rather curious contrast with the extremely jealous reaction to other changes in federal-state relations for which the Constitution provided. There were violent objections to federal control over state militia, to Congressional power to tax and to regulate commerce, to the creation of an inferior system of federal courts. All these things brought forth loud cries that the states would be swallowed up by the national government. These important restrictions on the economic powers of the states were received with relative silence. 
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publican government, which I shall attempt to draw together in the concluding section of this essay. Some parts of the answer can be put into the record here.
The attitude of the Anti-Federalists toward the people as distinguished from their representatives, and toward the general problem of majority rule, was not radically different from that of their opponents. It is a curious and remarkable fact that during the course of this great debate in which the most popular national constitution ever framed was submitted to the public for the most popular mode of ratification yet attempted, there was very little tendency on either side to enthrone "the people" or to defer automatically to their judgment. Neither side showed the slightest inclination to use as its slogan, "Vox populi vox Dei." Rather was the contrary true, and some of the Anti-Federalist expressions of this attitude could easily have fitted into the dark picture of human nature presented in The Federalist. Indeed, the speeches and essays of the Anti-Federalists were peculiarly lacking in the great expressions of faith in the people which are to be found in the writings of Jefferson, and even occasionally in The Federalist itself. This is partly to be accounted for because their position was a negative one; they attacked the proposed system on the ground that it would be destructive of liberty.
It was therefore perhaps natural that they sometimes expressed fear about what may be called the constituent capacity of the people-the capacity of the people to act wisely in the actual choice of a constitution. They were afraid that the people might not see in the proposed new government all of the dangers and defects which they themselves saw. And there were gloomy comments about lack of stability. Said George Clinton in the New York Convention, "The people, when wearied with their distresses, will in the moment of frenzy, be guilty of the most imprudent and desperate measures.... I know the people are too apt to vibrate from one extreme to another. The effects of this disposition are what I wish to guard against."12 His colleague, Melancton Smith, spoke in a similar vein:
Fickleness and inconstancy, he said, were characteristic of a free people; and, in framing a constitution for them, it was, perhaps, the most difficult thing to correct this spirit, and guard against the evil effects of it. He was Jersuaded it could not be altogether prevented without destroying their free-112 Elliot, II, p. 359. that the sober and industrious part of the community should be defended from the rapacity and violence of the vicious and idle. A bill of rights, therefore, ought to set forth the purposes for which the compact is made, and serves to secure the minority against the usurpation and tyranny of the majority.... The experience of all mankind has proved the prevalence of a disposition to use power wantonly. It is therefore as necessary to defend an individual against the majority in a republick as against the king in a monarchy.116
The reaction of the Anti-Federalists to the restrictions imposed on state legislative majorities by Article I, Section io of the Constitution is also relevant at this point. These provisions were certainly intended to protect the rights of property against legislative invasion by majorities. If there had been any spirit of doctrinaire majoritarianism among the opponents of the Constitution, this would surely have been the occasion to express it, and in quite unequivocal terms. There was very little open criticism of these provisions, none on the grounds that they violated the the principle of majority rule or that they were designed to protect the interests of the upper classes.117 What criticism there was, was expressed largely in terms of practical considerations.
Distrust of majority factions in much the same sense as Madison's was emphatically expressed by the one sector of Anti-Federalism which con--stituted the most self-conscious minority. Southerners felt keenly the con--flict of interest between North and South and were vehemently opposed -to surrendering themselves to the majority of the seven Eastern states. One of the reasons for George Mason's refusal to sign the Constitution had been his failure to get adopted a two-thirds majority vote for all laws affecting commerce and navigation. His fears for the South's interests were shared by his fellow Southerners and were frequently expressed in the Convention debates. "It will be a government of a faction," said William Grayson, "and this observation will apply to every part of it; for, having a majority, shared a large body of political ideas and attitudes, together with a common heritage of political institutions. For one thing, they shared a profound distrust of man's capacity to use power wisely and well. They believed self-interest to be the dominant motive of political behavior, no matter whether the form of government be republican or monarchical, and they believed in the necessity of constructing political machinery that would restrict the operation of self-interest and prevent men entrusted with political power from abusing it. This was the fundamental assumption of the men who wrote the Constitution, and of those who opposed its adoption, as well.
The fundamental issue over which Federalists and Anti-Federalists split was the question whether republican government could be extended to embrace a nation, or whether it must be limited to the comparatively small political and geographical units which the separate American states then constituted. The Anti-Federalists took the latter view; and in a sense they were the conservatives of 1787, and their opponents the radicals.
The Anti-Federalists were clinging to a theory of representative government that was already becoming obsolete, and would have soon become so even had they been successful in preventing the establishment of a national. government. Certainly it was a theory which could never have provided the working principles for such a government. For the AntiFederalists were not only localists, but localists in a way strongly reminiscent of the city-state theory of Rousseau's Social Contract. According to that theory, a society capable of being governed in accordance with the General Will had to be limited in size, population, and diversity. The Anti-Federalists had no concept of a General Will comparable to Rousseau's, and they accepted the institution of representation, where he had rejected it. But many of their basic attitudes were similar to his. Like him, they thought republican government subject to limitations of size, population, and diversity; and like him also, they thought the will of the people would very likely be distorted by the process of representation. In fact, their theory of representation and their belief that republican government could not be extended nation-wide were integrally related.
They regarded representation primarily as an institutional substitute for direct democracy and endeavored to restrict its operation to the performance of that function; hence their plea that the legislature should be an exact miniature of the people, containing spokesmen for all classes, all groups, all interests, all opinions, in the community; hence, too, their preference for short legislative terms of office and their inclination, especially in the sphere of state government, to regard representatives as delegates bound by the instructions of constituents rather than as men expected and trusted to exercise independent judgment. This was a natural stage in the development of representative govern ment, but it contained scveral weaknesses and was, I think, already obsolete in late eighteenthcentury America.
Its major weaknesses were closely akin to those of direct democracy itself, for representation of this kind makes difficult the process of genuine deliberation, as well as the reconciliation of diverse interests and opinions. Indeed, it is notable, and I think not accidental, that the body of Anti-Fedcralist thought as a whole showed little consideration of the necessity for compromise. The Founding Fathers were not democrats, but in their recognition of the role which compromise must play in the process of popular government, they were far more advanced than their opponents.
It is clear, too, that the same factors limiting the size and extent of direct democracies would also be operative in republics where representation is regarded only as a substitute for political participation by the whole people. Within their own frame of reference, the Anti-Federalists were quite right in insisting that republican government would work only in relatively small states, where the population was also small and relatively homogeneous. If there is great diversity among the people, with many interests and many opinions, then all cannot be represented without making the legislature as large and unwieldy as the citizen assemblies of ancient Athens. And if the system does not lend itself readily to compromise and conciliation, then the basis for a working consensus must be considerable homogeneity in the people themselves. In the opinion of the Anti-Federalists, the American people lacked that homogeneity.122 This Rousseauistic vision of a small, simple, and homogeneous democracy may have been a fine ideal, but it was an ideal even then. It was not to te found even in the small states, and none of the Anti-Federalists produced a satisfactory answer to Madison's analysis of the weaknesses in-122 I do not mean to suggest that the Anti-Federalist attitude concerning homogeneity and what modern social scientists refer to as consensus was hopelessly wrong. A degree of both is necessary for the successful operation of democracy, and the concept itself is an extremely valuable one. I would merely contend that the Federalist estimate of the degree required was both more liberal and more realistic. On the subject of the extent to which the American people were united in tradition, institutions, and ideas in 1787-1788, see Ranncy, "Bases of American Federalism."
